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Political and civil rights have deteriorated since the election of Field Marshal Abd El Fattah El Sisi 
as president of Egypt. And there is no prospect for significant political changes any time soon in 
Egypt. The public space is currently more restricted than any time after the 25th of January 
Revolution, with increasing reprisals against pro-democracy activists and civil society. Despite an 
intractable socio-economic crisis, the military-backed regime led by El Sisi has gained the support 
of growing numbers of Egyptians by pursuing politics of exclusion since the military removal of 
President Mohammed Morsi on 3 July 2013 and the unprecedented crackdown on the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The spread of disorder and civil conflicts in many countries in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) region as well as the rise of militant Islamists has pushed Egyptians to 
support this regime as a means to ensure security and stability. In this political climate, 
revolutionary and democratic political parties and movements have lost popularity. The military's 
involvement in the political process and the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood have deepened 
divisions within the democratic opposition. Regional and international geopolitical shifts have also 
significantly weakened the West’s leverage over domestic politics in Egypt.            	  	  
	  	  
The state under El Sisi has steadily expanded the scope of repression. Security measures and legal 
actions aim not only to stifle the Muslim Brotherhood and supporters of former President 
Mohammed Morsi, but also to prevent any potential mobilisation against the new regime and its 
policies. For this purpose, restrictive laws inherited from the Mubarak regime have been applied as 
well as new laws such as the Law Regulating Right of Assembly, Procession and Peaceful Protests 
decreed in November 2013 by former interim President Adly Mansour. The Muslim Brotherhood 
and its Freedom and Justice Party were curtailed by tough security measures and legal actions.1 
Most of their leaders are either on trial or convicted for terrorism related offenses, or in exile. This 
campaign aims to break the organisation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a strong political rival for 
the military. To thwart the use of religious institutions for political mobilisation against the state, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Brown, J. N. and Dunne, M. (2014) 'Egypt's Judges Join In: The Crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood Enters a New Phase'. Foreign Affairs, 1 
April. Available at:  http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141088/nathan-j-brown-and-michele-dunne/egypts-judges-join-in. 
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the government enforced tough measures to control religious institutions and places of worship.2 It 
has also continued to use religious rhetoric and apply conservative policies to legitmise itself and 
counter balance different religious forces. In this atmosphere, the improvement of rights such as 
religious freedom, gender equality and rights of religious minorities has not been possible.      
 
Thousands are currently in detention pending investigation or trial or after being convicted under 
the assembly law, including prominent human rights defenders and political activists who played 
leading roles in the 25th of January Revolution. The government recently declared its plans to 
amend this law after prominent young political activists, human rights defenders and journalists 
began a hunger strike to protest this law and urge the government to free political detainees. This 
declaration also came a few days before the first trip made by El Sisi to the US to take part in the 
United Nations General Assembly and while Egypt's human rights record was under review by the 
United Nations Universal Periodic Review in early October. However, there are serious indicators 
that this move does not mean that the state will temper its crackdown on political and human rights 
activism.  
 
On 18 July 2014, Egypt’s Ministry of Social Solidarity announced an ultimatum to human rights 
NGOs: register under Association Law No.84/2002 in a maximum period of 45 days or be 
prosecuted. This deadline was extended to November 10 after pressure from international actors.3 
Local and international NGOs and UN bodies have repeatedly denounced this law for its draconian 
restrictions on NGOs. But even this law is seen insufficient for the government to control civil 
society, as a new, yet more restrictive association law is reportedly being prepared to control NGO 
activities and access to domestic and foreign funding. This new law would ban human rights 
defenders from forming any legal entities such as non-profit companies or law firms outside of the 
association law. In the same direction, President El Sisi decreed an amendment to the Penal Code 
on 21 September which stipulates	   that	   'an	   individual	   requesting	   or	   receiving	   transferred	   or	  liquid	   money	   or	   arms	   or	   equipment	   from	   a	   foreign	   country	   or	   a	   foreign	   or	   local	   private	  organisation,	  with	   the	  aim	  of	  pursuing	  acts	  harmful	   to	  national	   interests	  or	  destabilising	   to	  general	   peace	   or	   the	   country’s	   independence	   and	   its	   unity,	   shall	   be	   penalised	   with	   a	   life	  sentence	  and	  a	  fine	  of	  no	  less	  than	  LE500,000	  and	  up	  to	  the	  amount	  he	  or	  she	  is	  promised'.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See Fahmi, G. (2014) 'The Egyptian State and the Religious Sphere', Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 18 September. Available at: 
http://carnegie-mec.org/2014/09/18/egyptian-state-and-religious-sphere/hpac.  
3 Mada Masr. (2014) 'Ministry Won't Extend Nov 10 Deadline for NGO', 2 October. Available at: http://www.madamasr.com/content/ministry-
wont-extend-nov-10-deadline-ngo-registration. 
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The	  ambiguous	  and	  broad	  language	  used	  in	  this	  provision	  as	  well	  as	  the	  political	  timing	  of	  its	  promulgation	  means	  it	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  used	  against	  human	  rights	  defenders	  and	  NGOs.4	  	  	  The stigmatising of human rights defenders has been routine in both public and private media, 
where they are accused of being traitors and spies. For the first time in Egypt, senior staff of Human 
Rights Watch (HRW), including its Executive Director, were denied entry to Egypt on 11 August 
and deported to prevent them from launching HRW's report on the mass killing of Muslim 
Brotherhood protesters during the dispersal of the Rab'a sit-in in August 2013. Over the past year, 
most international NGOs have closed their offices in Cairo, due to concern for the safety of their 
staff. Furthermore, new regulations were adopted in public universities which strictly limit students’ 
political activities in campuses. The government also announced its intentions to establish a new 
media regulatory body entrusted with overseeing printed and broadcasted media. According to news 
reports, this body would enjoy broad powers yet the independence of its membership is questioned. 
The performance of the police and National Security Service have come under scrutiny with 
increasing reported cases of torture and ill-treatment of political detainees and citizens. 	  
Egypt's judiciary has increasingly become an instrument for state repression. Egypt's law does not 
guarantee the independence of the judiciary.5 For decades, the executive has been able to influence 
judges through the powers of the ministry of justice. The appointment mechanisms of judges and 
prosecutors are not transparent and do not ensure equal opportunities. Egyptian rulers have 
attempted to impose their control over the judiciary. This pattern has not changed since the 2011 
Revolution.  
 
One of the major challenges that the judicial system in Egypt faces is the politicised and inefficient 
performance of the Office of the General Prosecutor who has been long susceptible to heavy 
political influence from the executive. The politicised and insufficient performance of the general 
prosecution stands behind the failure of Egypt's judiciary to provide justice for victims of grave 
human rights crimes committed during and after the 2011 Revolution. The President was entrusted 
with appointing the General Prosecutor but the Supreme Judicial Council now selects them. 
However, the politicised and non-transparent performance of the newly appointed General 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Mada Masr. (2014) 'President Amends Law to Include Life Sentence for Receiving Funds, Arms', 23 September. Available at:  
http://www.madamasr.com/content/president-amends-law-include-life-sentence-receiving-funds-arms.  
5  See International Bar Association (2014) Separating Law and Politics: Challenges to the Independence of Judges and Prosecutors in 
Egypt. Available at: http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=b30a63ae-8066-4b49-8758-c1684be5e9b9 ; See also  El Chazli, F and El 
Chazli K. (2011) Egypt: The Independence of the Judiciary. Copenhagen: EMHRN. Available 
at:http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/Egypt/The%20independence%20of%20Judiciary.pdf  
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Prosecutor suggests that this new appointment mechanism does not necessarily ensure their 
independence and that there are structural limitations in the institution of the judiciary that weaken 
the independence of judges and prosecutors and make them vulnerable to political influence. The 
Office of the General Prosecutor enjoys extensive powers in the Criminal Procedures Law, being 
mandated to collect evidence, conduct interrogation and indictment and refer accused persons to the 
courts. The law is lenient in allowing for pretrial detention, as prosecutors and judges have 
systematically ordered pretrial detention for prolonged periods in most freedom of expression and 
assembly related cases.  	  
The executive created another avenue to influence high profile political trials by establishing special 
circuits in January 2014 within ordinary criminal courts to examine terrorism and national security 
related cases. Judges in these circuits are selected by Chief Appellate judges. These special circuits 
tried leaders and members of the Muslim Brotherhood as well as prominent non-Islamist young 
political activists like Ahmed Doma and Alaa Abd El Fattah. Moreover, some prominent judges 
who opposed state policies since the ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood were excluded from the 
judiciary or subjected to disciplinary measures.6   
     	  
	  
Power shifts among political forces over the past year explain a grim reality of political and civil 
rights. Political actors who are disappointed with the political trajectory taken by Egypt after the 
ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood are stuck with very limited political options. Street action is not 
viable given the popularity of Egypt's new president, and risks increasing state repression and 
public concerns over disorder and instability. Some political groups still use protests and strikes as a 
means to pressure the state but citizens' participation in these activities has become largely symbolic 
and is not likely to lead to massive popular movements of the type seen until the ousting of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held by the end of this year, seem to 
be one option to allow political parties to achieve some influence over state institutions, given that 
parliamentary legislative prerogatives and oversight roles over the executive are consolidated under 
2014 Constitution. Most importantly, the party or the coalition that holds the parliamentary majority 
will select the prime-minister and the cabinet.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Aziz, S. (2014) 'Egypt's Judiciary, Coopted', Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 20 August. Available at: 
http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2014/08/20/egypt-s-judiciary-coopted/hljn  
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However, under current political dynamics there is very little prospect that the new parliament 
would improve the conditions of citizenship rights in Egypt. Liberal and leftist forces that are 
deemed closer to the revolutionary agenda have no chance to be properly represented in this 
parliament. The electoral law passed in June 2014 by former interim President Adly Mansour 
establishes an electoral system where candidates elected on an individual basis will take up 420 of 
the 540 parliamentary seats, while 120 will be elected from closed party lists. This law privileges 
those politicians and parties who were traditionally winning parliamentary seats thanks to their 
financial capacity, family or tribal ties, and is likely to produce a fragmented parliament.7 
Moreover, the increasing restrictions on freedom of expression, association and assembly hinder the 
mobilisation capacity  of these forces. The same restrictive environment was seen during the 
Presidential election, which according to the EU's observation mission was not competitive and fair, 
even though the technical aspects of the electoral process were positive.8  
 
The current political landscape limits the likely political impact of this election. In the absence of a 
coherent alliance by revolutionary liberal and leftist parties, the political space left by the fall of the 
Muslim Brotherhood was occupied by other forces that are not sympathetic with the demands of the 
2011 Revolution.  The constituency of the Muslim Brotherhood has been heavily undermined by far 
reaching repressive measures taken by the state since July 2013. This policy of political exclusion 
hampers the integration of peaceful and revisionist voices from Muslim Brotherhood into the 
political process. Other dissenting Islamist parties with historical ties to the Muslim Brotherhood 
are still allowed to exist but they face the same oppressive political environment met by liberal and 
leftist opposition parties and it is not yet clear if they will succeed in attracting young members of 
the Muslim Brotherhood into their ranks. The Salafist al-Nour Party is the only Islamist party that 
openly endorses the military. Drawing on the absence of the Muslim Brotherhood, this party is now 
preparing itself for an influential place in the new parliament. Prominent members of Mubarak 
regime have used the polarised political climate since the ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood to re-
emerge in the political scene. They gather under the umbrella of the Egyptian Front Coalition which 
includes the Congress Party headed by Amr Moussa, the Egyptian Nationalist Movement, led by 
Ahmed Shafiq, the former president candidate and Mubarak's last Prime-Minister. This coalition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Rabou, A. A. (2014) 'What Future Awaits Egypt's Political Parties: Analaysing New Legislation for the House of Representatives', Arab Reform 
Initiative. Available at: http://www.arab-reform.net/what-future-awaits-egypt%E2%80%99s-political-parties-analyzing-new-legislation-house-
representatives  
8 European Union Election Observation Mission. (2014) Final Report: Presidential Elections May 2014. Available at:   
http://eeas.europa.eu/eueom/missions/2014/egypt/pdf/eueom-egypt2014-final-report_en.pdf  
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also includes the left-leaning al-Tajamu' Party and its mouthpiece is Mostafa Bakry, a media figure 
known of his strong support of El Sisi.  
 
Today, remnants of the Mubarak regime and the Salafist al-Nour Party are the most powerful 
political actors that dominate parliamentary elections in the short run. They manage the strong 
electoral machinery and have financial means to support their political work, not to mention the 
recently fragmented political scene which has increased their political chances. But despite both 
camps now being closer to El Sisi, their interests diverge on some matters. The state under El Sisi 
attempts to monopolise religious institutions and incorporate all religious groups into the official 
state's policy. This orientation does not satisfy Salafists who want to propagate their ideology 
through their preaching activities and religious association. The economic interests of remnants of 
Mubarak regime would not be in full harmony with the economic policies of El Sisi under which 
military benefits have increased over business privileges; businessmen are requested to pay some 
costs for the economic recovery.           
 
The other political parties and groups which were part of the revolutionary momentum of 2011 
currently suffer from internal divisions and lack of coherent strategy. These parties supported the 
ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood by the military but the restrictive political reality that emerged 
in the post-Morsi era went against their wishes. The Democratic Coalition is made up of a group of 
liberal and leftist parties that joined the protests of 30 June and supported the Muslim Brotherhood 
ousting. It includes the Popular Current led former presidential candidates Hamdeen Sabbahi, the 
Constitution (Al-Dustur) Party, the Popular Socialist Alliance Party, the liberal Egypt Freedom 
(Misr al-Hurriyya) Party and the Justice (Al-Adl) Party. This coalition is critical of the ongoing 
crackdown of the opposition and civil society and sympathetic to the aspirations of revolutionary 
young activists. However, its popular support is limited.  
 
The Egyptian Wafd Coalition is another coalition composed of two key liberal parties, Al-Wafd 
Party and the Egyptian Social Democratic Party as well as other small parties such as the Reform 
and Development Party and the Conservative Party. The liberal Free Egyptians Party, founded by 
the businessmen Naguib Sawiris decided to run for the parliamentary elections independently. 
Positions taken by the two blocks are less conformational with El Sisi and the military and less 
vocal about ongoing human rights abuses. Based on their performance in previous parliamentary 
elections, the two blocks can increase the political and electoral weigh for the coalition. Leaders of 
the Democratic Coalition try to unite with the Egyptian Wafd Coalition and the Free Egyptians 
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Party but it is not clear yet if these efforts would succeed given the different political and 
ideological interests.  	  	  	  
	  	  
The current crisis of citizenship rights in Egypt is profound. Any prospects for an expansion of 
rights are very low in the near future and major political change is not forseen. Political opposition 
has limited options to challenge the current regime given its deep political and ideological 
fragmentation and the withdrawal of public sympathy towards revolutionary and democratic forces. 
Despite deep economic and social hardships, the popular support for El Sisi and the military is 
remarkable. Drawing on public fears from disorder, state collapse and threats of violent Islamist 
groups, the current ruling elite has been able to hold its grip on power and oppress their 
competitors. These fears have been maximised by states’ failures in neighboring Arab states and the 
rise of militant Jihadists in Syria, Iraq and Libya.  
 
However, the continuation of this status quo in the long run might not be ensured without real 
improvement in socio-economic conditions as well as the inclusion of other Islamist and non-
Islamist forces which are alienated under this regime. State repression, lack of accountability and 
political exclusion risk fueling endless cycles of radicalisation and political violence in the Egyptian 
society by 'push[ing] alienated Egyptians into the arms of extremist groups, as well as creat[ing] a 
broader swath of society unwilling to help the army or police defeat them'.9  
 
Egypt is keen to regain its political, economic and security ties with the US and EU but since the 
ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood, El Sisi has been maneuvering regionally and internationally to 
reduce the ability of Western actors to influence domestic politics in Egypt. He has established a 
strong political, economic and military alliance with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Emirates and 
furthered trade and military ties with Russia. The US and EU still sees Egypt as a key strategic 
partner in the MENA and they look ready to deepen their engagement with its new leader despite 
their concerns over Egypt's political scene since the ousting of Morsi. President Obama was keen to 
meet El Sisi for the first time on the sidelines of UN General Assembly meetings in September, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See Dunne, M. and Williamson, S. (2014) Egypt, Counterterrorism, and the Politics of Alienation, 20 August. Available at: 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/08/20/egypt-counterterrorism-and-politics-of-alienation/hlk4  
CONCLUSIONS 
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describing US ties with Egypt as 'a cornerstone of American security policy in the Middle East'. US 
decided to resume its economic and military aid to Egypt. In return, Egypt also announced its 
political support for US-led military campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant. Neither 
the US nor EU currently have enough leverage to achieve breakthrough in the respect for human 
rights and political pluralism in Egypt but certain specific human rights objectives can be gradually 
achieved through diplomacy, economic motives and military cooperation. Amongst these objectives 
is to urge Egypt to provide an enabling and safe environment for civil society, human rights 
defenders and the media. Any future technical cooperation with the government of Egypt should be 
directly linked with the improvement in freedom of association and freedom of expression. Both 
areas are key to help Egypt's political and civil society survive and mobilise.            
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